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Starting July the 1st 1997, Bulgaria adopted a Currency Board (CB) monetary system. This 
paper aims at investigating if the adoption of the CB monetary system, which involves the 
cost of loosing monetary autonomy, has provided a relatively better (with respect to other 
CEEC) monetary integration of Bulgaria with the European Monetary Union (EMU). Since 
Bulgarian monetary variables are endogenous under a CB, we focus on the ECB and FED 
interest rates as the main sources on monetary volatility. First, we find that ECB shocks are 
more rapidly absorbed and have less significant impact of domestic variables, with respect to 
other external monetary shocks (FED rate changes). Second, the responses of Bulgarian 
variables following changes in the ECB interest rate present lower persistence and 
significance, with respect to what the previous literature emphasized for other CEEC with 
monetary autonomy. This latter result still holds when accounting for different sources of 
cross-country heterogeneity outlined in the literature, thus supporting that the adoption of the 
CB may have worked as a rather good device in terms of integration of Bulgaria into the 
EMU. 
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I. Introduction 
The evolution of the Bulgarian economy between the fall of the communist wall and 
1996 may be characterized by  high instability.  With only  20% of assets being privatized 
before  1997  and  political  pressure  on  banks  to  subsidy  loss-generating  state-owned 
companies,  the  financial  system  became  increasingly  fragile  and  accumulated  massive 
amounts of “bad” credits. This “bad” dynamic in the transition process was accompanied by 
deterioration in monetary conditions. To overcome the reduction of foreign currency reserves 
to some 500 million USD, the monetary authorities proceeded to subsequent exchange rate 
devaluations in 1994-1995. These devaluations had only some temporary effect and reserves 
dropped again to some critical threshold in mid-1996, leading to the start of the crisis. During 
1997, after several devaluations superior to 50%, the exchange rate of the Bulgarian Lev 
(BGL) with respect to the US Dollar (USD) suffered an impressive devaluation of 230%, 
reserves felt to a historical minimum of 300 million USD, monthly inflation and the base 
interest rate rose up to 250%, real activity shrank by 7% and unemployment climbed to 14% 
(for more details see Berlemann and Nenovsky, 2004). 
Following this severe twin (currency and banking) crisis, there was need for a new 
monetary system. This new system should answer to two requirements: stop the crisis and 
provide long-term stability. Since an inflation-targeting system is based on reputation and 
thus powerless in the short-run, Bulgaria adopted on February the 17
th 1997 the decision to 
introduce a Currency Board (CB) monetary system (the CB became effective after the April 
elections, namely starting July the 1
st 1997). Thus, Bulgaria joined Estonia and Lithuania who 
introduced CBs in 1992 and 1994 respectively.
1 
The goal of the present paper is to explore the influence of the adoption of the CB 
monetary system in terms of the integration of Bulgaria into the European Monetary Union 
(EMU).  Indeed,  embracing  a  CB  is  a  rather  strong  and  radical  decision,  since  monetary 
authorities lose the autonomy of the monetary policy, as “market forces alone determine the 
quantity of notes and coins in circulation” (Schuler, 1992, p.2). Thus, it would be interesting 
to examine if the cost of accepting the loss of monetary policy autonomy was backed up by 
better  performances,  particularly  with  respect  to  other  Central  and  Eastern  European 
Countries (CEEC) that conserved monetary autonomy, in terms of EMU integration. 
                                                 
1 Although currently relatively few countries still use CBs (among which, Bosnia, Djibouti or Hong Kong), they 
continued  to  be  studied  as  they  may  provide  insights  about  related  forms  of  monetary  arrangements  (i.e. 
dollarization or monetary unions).   2 
To this end, we move away from the existing literature by exploring the consequences 
of  the  presence  of  a  CB  in  two  directions.  First,  we  aim  at  identifying  an  appropriate 
exogenous monetary shock, as domestic monetary variables, and in particular the Bulgarian 
interest rate, which are often used as a source of monetary disturbances (see, for example, 
Elbourne and de Haan, 2006) are endogenous in a CB monetary system.
2 After considering 
several potential candidates, we select the ECB interest rate and the FED interest rate as the 
main  sources  of  monetary  shocks  affecting  the  Bulgarian  economy.
3  Second,  as  recently 
stressed  out  by  Egert  and  MacDonald  (2009),  the  largest  majority  of  papers  studying 
monetary policy transmission build on (recursive) Structural VARs (SVARs). However, while 
more is known about monetary policy transmission in countries with autonomous monetary 
policy, the evidence about the order in which shocks propagate under a CB is still very crude. 
To avoid this kind of misspecifications, we use a different approach, based on Generalized 
Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998), which, contrary 
to (recursive) SVARs, present the property of being insensitive to the ordering of variables.
4 
  We find first that the responses of Bulgarian variables to ECB shocks are short-lived 
and little significant, contrary to what is usually found in the literature for other CEEC with 
monetary autonomy (see the survey of Egert and MacDonald, 2009).
5 Second, we question 
the  robustness  of  our  findings  by  accounting  for  the  three  main  sources  of  cross-country 
heterogeneity outlined in the literature (see Elbourne and de Haan, 2004), namely i) different 
identification  schemes,  ii)  different  variables,  and  iii)  different  time  periods.  Finally,  we 
compare  the  responses  of  Bulgarian  variables  to  ECB  and  FED  interest  rate  changes 
respectively,  and  find  that  ECB  shocks  are  more  rapidly  absorbed  and  present  lower 
significance.  Based  on  theses  findings,  Bulgaria  seems  to  be  better  integrated  than  other 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), and the adoption of a CB monetary system 
seems to have contributed to this process. 
                                                 
2 We use the term “exogenous” to account for a discretionary decision: for example, the ECB interest rate is 
exogenous, as it may be discretionary changed by the ECB, while variations in the Bulgarian interest rate are 
endogenous, in the  way that, because of the presence of  a CB, they are determined exclusively by  market 
responses and not by the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB). 
3 The Bulgarian LEV is currently anchored to the EURO (1 EUR = 1.95583 BGL) through the CB mechanism. 
Section two develops the way the FED interest rate may affect the Bulgarian economy. 
4 To put  it  differently,  the  use  of  GIRF  prevents  us  from  imposing  constraints  about  which  we  have  little 
knowledge (however, for robustness issues, we propose a comparison of our results with those from a SVAR). 
5  The  few  studies  dealing  with  monetary  policy  transmission  in  countries  with  monetary  systems  close  to 
Bulgaria  (see,  for  example,  Lättemäe,  2003,  for  Estonia;  Vetlov,  2003,  for  Lithuania;  or Babich,  2001,  for 
Latvia) also emphasize modest responses.   3 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we discuss the choice of 
an exogenous monetary shock, and then describe the data and the model. Section three reports 
our main results and several robustness tests, and section four concludes. 
 
II. The sources of monetary volatility in a CB and data presentation 
 
2.1. The identification of exogenous monetary shocks 
The architecture of the Bulgarian CB monetary system involves the existence of a 
fixed exchange rate between the BGL and the anchor (the EURO). An important feature is 
that under this monetary arrangement neither monetary aggregates, nor the domestic interest 
rate, can be considered as pure monetary domestic instruments and used accordingly. In terms 
of  our  future  modelling,  this  implies  that  studying  exogenous  changes  in  either  domestic 
interest  rate  or  monetary  aggregates  (which  is  econometrically  computable)  has  limited 
interpretation  (see,  for  example,  Hanke  and  Schuler,  1994).  Thus,  to  explore  the  relative 
integration of the Bulgaria economy in the EMU, we study the responses of the Bulgarian 
economy to two external monetary shocks. 
  First, and most important, we focus on changes in the ECB interest rate. Since the 
Bulgarian currency is fixed against the EURO, changes in the ECB interest rate should exert a 
considerable  effect  on  the  Bulgarian  domestic  interest  rate  and  further  on  all  key 
macroeconomic variables. 
Second, notice that pegging against an anchor does not completely offset fluctuations, 
since the domestic currency can float against other trade partners’ currencies. An interesting 
example is Lithuania, where from 2002 on the currency was anchored to the EURO, while an 
important share of trade is done with Russia (although the EU is the most important trade 
partner).  In  this  case,  studying  the  effect  of  changes  in  the  monetary  conditions  (i.e.  the 
interest rate) that affect the currency of an important trade partner (different from the “anchor 
currency” partner) might produce interesting insights. Consequently, we look at the reaction 
of the Bulgarian economy following variations in the FED interest rate.
6 
7 
                                                 
6 The effect of changes in the FED interest rate transits through the trade activity with the United States, but also 
(particularly) with countries that are/were linked to the USD in recent times, namely Turkey, Russia, etc. 
7 A certain strand of the literature focuses on the distinction between “first generation” (orthodox) and “second 
generation” (quasi-CB) Currency Boards (see Hanke, 2007). Since the Bulgarian CB is of second-generation, the 
BNB may, contrary to orthodox CBs, run some restricted form of active monetary policy, mainly through three 
instruments: the minimum required ratio (see Nenovsky et al, 2001), the BNB account with the Government (see 
Nenovsky and Hristov, 2002), and the Lender-of-Last-Resort (LOLR) function (see Berlemann and Nenovsky, 
2004). However, as pointed out by these authors, changes in these instruments are extremely rare and their   4 
 
2.2. Data and methodological considerations 
To investigate the effects of monetary policy disturbances on the Bulgarian economy, 
we consider a multivariate representation. We first describe the data and examine the time 
series properties of variables, before discussing the modelling strategy. 
 
2.2.1. Data set and unit root tests 
Data  are  quarterly  and  cover  the  period  Q3:1999  until  Q4:2010,  leading  to  46 
observations. Even if Bulgaria introduced the CB on July the 1
st 1997, our sample starts with 
the 3
rd quarter of 1999, to allow for variables to “stabilize” after this important shock.
8 As 
detailed above, since changes in Bulgarian monetary variables are not discretionary-decided, 
we turn first our attention to the ECB refinancing interest rate. However, changes in the ECB 
interest rate are too rare to produce the necessary amount of variability in our analysis, and, in 
line with other studies (see, for example, Reynard, 2007), we use the LIBOR EUR 3 months 
interest rate ( )
EU i . 
In the basic model, we study the impact of the 
EU i  on four variables, which we select 
with respect to two goals. On the one hand, we aim studying the response of most important 
monetary (since little is known about their behaviour in a CB monetary system) and real 
variables. On the other hand, we restrict our benchmark VAR to five variables, since results 
may be already affected by the size of the sample. 
The four remaining variables in our basic VAR are the following. First, we consider 
the Bulgarian interest rate 
BG i , defined as the “money market rate” (three months maturity). 
Indeed, because of the CB, the BNB has no interference on this interest rate and 
BG i  may be 
considered to properly characterize the credit market stance. Second, we focus on a broad 
money indicator M , defined as the annual quarter-to-quarter growth rate of nominal  3 M . To 
capture the effects on prices, we use the annual (quarter-to-quarter) growth rate of consumer 
prices (inflation)  IPC.
9 Finally, to look for some real economy effects, we include the annual 
(quarter-to-quarter) growth rate of real output (GDP), denoted by Y. All these variables, as 
well as the LIBOR EUR 3 months interest rate, come from the BNB dataset. 
                                                                                                                                                          
impact on the Bulgarian economy is significantly smaller with respect to the effect of the ECB and the FED 
interest rates. 
8 For example, changes in consumer prices (inflation) greatly oscillate among high values (65.7% change in 
Q1:1998 relative to Q1:1997) and negative values (-0.9% change in Q2:1999 relative to Q2:1998). 
9 Lavrac (2004) discusses the inflation targeting in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and concludes that 
the appropriate measure for inflation is the “headline inflation rate” (the change in consumer price index and not 
inflation net of regulated prices). See also Orlowski (2000) and Coricelli, Egert and MacDonald (2006).   5 
The  first  step  of  the  analysis  is  to  look  at  the  macroeconomic  data  univariate 
properties. Two classes of tests allow investigating the presence of a unit root: unit root tests 
(see  Ng  and  Perron,  2001)  and  stationarity  tests  (the  most  popular  are  the  Kwiatkovski-
Phillips-Schmidt-Shin KPSS, 1992, and the Leyborne-McCabe LMC, 1999).
10 As recently 
stressed by Carrion-i-Silvestre and Sanso (2006), the main drawback of stationarity tests is the 
difficulty entailed by the estimation of the long-run variance needed to compute them. We 
follow their recommendations and apply the KPSS test using the procedure developed by Sul-
Phillips-Choi (SPC, 2005) to estimate the long-run variance. This strategy involves less size 
distortion compared to the LMC test, while preserving reasonable power. 
The results of the KPSS tests, reported in Table 1, indicate that the null stationarity 
hypothesis around a constant or around a linear trend root cannot be rejected at the 5% level 
of significance, for all macroeconomic series under consideration (the first five appear in the 
first model and the next two in the second one). Therefore, it seems reasonable to treat all 
series under consideration as  ( ) 0 I  processes.
11 
Table 1 – Stationarity tests for macroeconomic series 
(a) 
Series  KPSS with constant 
(b)  KPSS with time trend 
(b) 
ECB Interest Rate (IEU)  0.223756  0.082383 
Money Market Rate (IBG)  0.093478  0.085510 
Money BG (M)  0.245731  0.115434 
Inflation BG (IPC)  0.096264  0.085243 
Output BG (Y)  0.272918  0.134829 
FED Interest rate (IUS)  0.224372  0.105196 
BGL/USD Exchange rate (BGL)  0.170843  0.142673 
  Critical Values  Critical Values 
cv (1%)  0.739  0.216 
cv (5%)  0.463  0.146 
cv (10%)  0.347  0.119 
(a) We apply the KPSS test using the procedure of Sul et al. (2005) to estimate the long-run variance. 
(b)  We  used  the  AIC  criterion  to  select  the  order  of  the  autoregressive  correction  with 
pmax ( ) [ ]
4 / 1 100 / 12 int T = . We report the finite sample critical values drawn from the response surfaces 
in Sephton (1995). The null hypothesis of the KPSS test is “stationarity around a constant or around a 
(linear) time trend”. 
 
2.2.2. Methodological Considerations 
Since all series taken in level are integrated of order zero, it is possible to investigate the 
dynamic  relationships  among  our  set  of  variables  in  a  VAR  model  using  innovation 
accounting methods such as impulse response functions.  For the reasons described in the 
introduction we implement the recently developed “generalized” impulse response functions 
                                                 
10 In contrast to unit root tests, stationarity tests specify the null hypothesis of stationarity against the alternative 
of non-stationarity, so they can be seen as the reversal complement of the unit root tests. 
11 Besides, on the one hand, further unit root tests (for example Elliott-Rothemberg-Stock ERS, 1996, results are 
available upon request) reject the presence of a unit root in all considered series. On the other hand, since in all 
considered VARs in levels IRFs rapidly come to zero after a shock on a variable supports that series are  ( ) 0 I .   6 
(GIRFs) suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1998), which are insensitive to the ordering of the 
variables  in  the  VAR  (see  Appendix  A).
12  Besides,  the  ability  of  the  GIRFs  to  capture 
immediate responses of endogenous variables to shocks is clearly useful when information is 
quickly assimilated, as it may be the case in a CB. 
 
III. VAR investigation and examination of dynamic responses 
 
  In the first subsection we study the response of variables following an impulse on the 
ECB interest rate. These results are completed in the second subsection by evidence following 
a change in the FED monetary policy. 
 
3.1. The effect of a change in the ECB interest rate on the Bulgarian economy 
We first illustrate results for the basic VAR, before exploring the robustness of our findings. 
 
3.1.1. The basic model 
Since  our  results  are  based  on  GIRFs,  the  order  of  variables  in  the  VAR  is 
unimportant.  Let  us  suppose,  without  generality  loss,  the  following  transmission  scheme: 
M IPC Y i i
BG EU ® ® ® ® . An ECB interest rate  ( )
EU i  shock is considered to impact first 
the  Bulgarian  interest  rate  ( )
BG i .  Changes  in  interest  rate 
BG i   are  supposed  to  affect  the 
growth rate of real activity (output), followed by changes in consumer prices  IPC and in 
domestic nominal money growth M .
13 
Before implementing a generalized impulse response analysis, we must choose the 
optimal lag length in the benchmark VAR. Using the LR test and four information criteria 
(see  Appendix  1),  we  choose  the  lag  1.  Appendix  2  reports  the  inverse  roots  of  the  AR 
characteristic polynomial of the estimated VAR and clearly confirms its stationarity, since all 
roots lie inside the unit circle (see Lütkepohl, 1991). Consequently, the estimated VAR may 
be used for a generalized impulse response analysis.
14 To check the quality of the multivariate 
estimation, we performed several test concerning the serial correlation (LM tests), as well as 
ARCH tests and the Jarque-Bera normality test. Results in Appendix 1 confirm that the VAR 
model  is  well  behaved  and  not  subject  to  misspecification,  since  all  usual  hypotheses 
                                                 
12 For robustness issues, we compare GIRFs with IRFs from a SVAR (see section 3.1.2 below). 
13 According to KPSS stationarity tests in Table 1, all series are considered in level and we include a constant. 
14 Since (i) all series of our database are integrated of order zero and (ii) the inverse roots of the characteristic 
AR polynomial of the estimated VAR all lie inside the unit circle, the question of cointegration testing between 
these series is of course not relevant.   7 
concerning the residuals of each equation are verified. Figure 1 below depicts the results of a 
generalized  impulse  response  analysis  for  the  benchmark  VAR,  together  with  their 
bootstrapped 95% confidence bands. 
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Response of M to IEU
Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
Note for all VARs: The fact that GIRFs to shocks stabilize and come back towards zero 
indicates on the one hand, that the VAR model is correctly specified and, on the other, that all 
macroeconomic series are integrated of order zero. 
 
Figure 1 provides interesting evidence about the reaction of domestic variables in a 
CB monetary system, following exogenous external shocks. First, we observe that an increase 
in the ECB interest rate leads to a non significant increase in the Bulgarian interest rate on the 
impact; afterwards, the Bulgarian interest rate follows the ECB rate with a small lag (about 1-
2 quarters). However, the response of the Bulgarian interest rate is both short-lasted, since 
statistically significant at the 5% lever for only 4 quarters, and with a low magnitude of 0.4% 
arising after 4-5 quarters. With respect to the existent literature, two points worth be noticing. 
First, our result is contrary to previous studies outlining large and persistent effects in CEEC 
with monetary autonomy. For example, a recent contribution from Gavin and Kemme (2009) 
finds that the interest rate presents a significant reaction for 12 quarters for Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland. Second, our finding are in line with previous evidence on the existence 
of small and non-significant responses of the domestic interest rate in countries with monetary 
systems close to Bulgaria, see EFN (2004) for the CBs in Estonia and Lithuania. Thus, the   8 
endogenous Bulgarian interest rate is, compared to other countries, intimately linked to the 
ECB rate, in terms of magnitude, significance and dynamics (lag); this rapid transmission of 
shocks may suggest that Bulgaria is better integrated with the EMU with respect to other 
CEEC (as it also seems to be the case for other countries with a CB monetary system). 
What is however striking is that output first increases, before exhibiting the traditional 
hump-shaped, as a response to a higher interest rate. As for the adjustment of the Bulgarian 
interest  rate,  this  may  be  seen  as  a  sign  for  good  monetary  integration.  Indeed,  agents 
anticipate that, given the strict monetary linkage of Bulgaria with the EMU through the CB, 
the divergences between the Bulgarian interest rate and the ECB rate cannot be long-lasting; 
or, to put it differently, the Bulgarian interest rate is expected to closely follow the path of the 
ECB rate. However, for a short period of time the domestic interest rate is lower with respect 
to the ECB rate, which may enhance investment and consumption, provided that the financial 
market is sufficiently integrated to the Euro Area markets in order to supply the necessary 
amount of liquidity;
15 in this case, output increases. Nevertheless, as explained above, the 
interest rate differential is short-lived: as soon as the two rates are converging, the Bulgarian 
output exhibits the traditional hump-shaped response according to the related literature; yet 
again, this response is statistically non-significant.
16 
Consequently, the behaviour of the Bulgarian output presents two different outcomes 
with respect to other CEEC: on the one hand, there is no evidence of such a positive reaction 
of output in the short-run (see Table 5 in Egert and MacDonald, 2009, surveying results for 
CEEC in comparable econometric frameworks). On the other hand, this positive short-run 
effect  moves the  entire  path of the output upwards,  making the  medium-run effects non-
significant.  Our  findings  contradict  recent  evidence  for  CEEC  with  monetary  autonomy, 
outlining significant and persistent output contractions (see Borys, Horvath and Franta, 2009, 
for the Czech Republic, and Touré, Trabelsi and Dufourt, 2009, for Hungary and Poland). 
Concerning  the  remaining  variables,  money  positively  responds  in  the  short-run, 
which may be in accordance with the CB functioning: since the money stock in Bulgaria is 
money-demand determined, the raise in nominal  3 M  naturally follows the short-run increase 
in  output  (a  transaction  motive).  As  for  prices,  in  a  country  with  complete  autonomy  of 
                                                 
15 We elaborate on the Bulgarian financial sector in the next section (see the robustness tests (b)).  
16 There exists an alternative explanation for the positive reaction of output following a monetary contraction, 
equally based on the crucial role of expectations. Using monthly data, Elbourne and de Haan (2006) report such 
an effect for Romania, which in their view may arise if the increase in the interest rate is seen as a change in the 
monetary strategy for fighting inflation, in high inflation countries. This explanation may also apply to Bulgaria, 
where the fixed exchange rate strictly constraints the Bulgarian inflation to follow the Euro Area inflation, all the 
more that in Bulgaria devaluations are forbidden by the law.   9 
monetary policy one would expect an increase in the interest rate to reduce inflation. The 
counter-intuitive  increase  in  inflation  is  not  new  (the  so-called  “price  puzzle”,  see  Sims, 
1992), but in our analysis this increase may also reproduce the pressure on prices coming 
from the increase in output. Finally, notice that the statistical significance of the responses of 
both  prices  and  money  is  modest,  as  it  was  previously  pointed  out  for  other  European 
countries with a CB (see EFN, 2004).  
Our interpretation of these results builds on the idea that both Bulgarian interest rate 
and money are endogenous with respect to external monetary shocks. Since the Bulgarian 
economy is closely linked to the EMU, both in terms of financial markets and the exchange 
rate, agents expect the Bulgarian interest rate to rapidly follow the ECB rate dynamics. In our 
case, agents anticipate a future increase in the domestic interest rate, and, to take benefit of a 
current  interest  rate  lower  than  in  the  future,  they  increase  domestic  consumption  and 
investment, which leads to a higher output in the short-run, and moreover higher prices and 
money. However, as previously acknowledged, these effects are, contrary to evidence for the 
CEEC  with  monetary  autonomy,  short-lived  and  little  significant,  suggesting  that  the 
Bulgarian economy may be better integrated into the EMU with respect to these countries. 
 
3.1.2. Robustness Tests 
Before presenting robustness tests, we would like to readdress the issue of comparing 
GIRFs and SVARs. As already emphasized, the advantage of GIRFs is that responses are 
immune  to  the  ordering  of  the  variables,  which  may  be  important  when  there  is  little 
knowledge about this order (as it may be the case in a CB). However, this also implies giving 
up the advantages of SVARs, namely the use  of economic-derived  constraints to achieve 
SVAR  identification.  Suppose  the  transmission  mechanisms  used  above,  namely 
M IPC Y i i
BG EU ® ® ® ® ,  which  now  reflects  our  economic  intuition.  To  capture  this 
transmission, we may use a recursive SVAR, with variables specified in this same order. IRFs 
depicted in Appendix B show that the response of Bulgarian variables is still short-lived and 
of low magnitude, in line with previous evidence.
17 
With respect to the basic VAR we now  consider several  experiments to check its 
robustness, by estimating different alternative VAR models. Elbourne and de Hann (2004) 
identified three main sources of cross-country heterogeneity, namely i) different identification 
                                                 
17 Finally, one may contest the transmission mechanism described above, in particular after the Bulgarian output. 
Consequently, we have estimated a SVAR model in which  IPC  and  M  change order (M  is placed fourth and 
IPC  fifth). We report that results for this SVAR are qualitatively unchanged (results are available upon request).   10 
schemes, ii) different variables, and iii) different time periods. One could agree that the use of 
GIRFs protects our results from the first problem. Moreover, if introducing other variables 
has little impact on our results,
18 one may criticise our findings with respect to the choice of 
the time period and the length of the sample (the third problem). To tackle this issue, we 
discuss three developments of the benchmark VAR: (a) we reduce the number of variables, 
(b) we consider the option of a structural break with respect to the reforms of the Bulgarian 
financial system, and (c) we increase the number of observations by using monthly data. 
 
(a) In order to reduce the number of variables in the VAR, the most intuitive transformation is 
to replace nominal money  M  and  IPC with real money  MR, in a four-variables VAR (
EU i , 
BG i , Y , MR). Figure 2 presents the results. 
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Response of MR to IEU
Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
According to Figure 2, following a positive shock on the ECB interest rate, the Bulgarian 
interest rate path is close to its path in the basic VAR, while output is still significantly raising 
in the short-run. Real money increases in the short-run, but, contrary to nominal money, its 
response  is  not  statistically  significant,  showing  once  again  that  in  a  CB  real  effects  are 
narrow. 
Appendix 3 supplements the above analysis by depicting reaction functions following 
a shock on 
EU i  for two more four-variables VARs. First, we explore the response of the 
Bulgarian interest rate when abstracting from money effects, in the VAR: 
EU i ,
BG i ,  Y  and 
                                                 
18 In a previous version of the paper we show that our main results are unaffected when controlling for different 
variables outside the VAR structure, namely the public deficit (or debt) to GDP ratio, or external prices (or the 
world commodity prices) to check for the robustness of the initial raise in prices (the usual “price puzzle”, 
although in our setup the rise in prices may be explained by the initial increase in output). These results are 
unreported here to save space, but are available upon request.   11 
IPC . Our results are qualitatively unchanged: the Bulgarian interest rate follows the ECB rate 
with a lag, while output and inflation significantly increase in the short-run, with all variables 
displaying short-lived reactions. Second, since the reaction of the Bulgarian interest rate is 
robust even when abstracting from money, it would be interesting to explore the way money 
M  responds when 
BG i  is absent from the VAR. This strategy could also be supported by the 
fact that most borrowing is taking place in the anchor currency. As with prior VARs, GIRFs 
in Appendix 3 clearly support previous conclusions, as reaction functions display comparable 
shapes and statistical significance. 
 
(b) The second robustness analysis is inspired by Figure 3, which depicts the LIBOR EUR 3 
months interest rate  ( )
EU i  and the Bulgarian money market rate  ( )
BG i , both in quarterly data 
for the 1999:Q3 – 2010:Q4 period. 
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One can easily observe that the LIBOR and the Bulgarian interest rates seem to follow rather 
different dynamics up until the middle of 2003. Indeed, at that period, the Bulgarian banking 
system  experienced  several  reforms.  These  reforms  concern  the  presence  of  high  (above 
requested) liquidity ratios, the progressive reduction of high risks exposures and of the share 
of credits to the public sector, and the appearance of a Banking Department within the BNB, 
which deals exclusively with bank supervision and regulation. 
Moreover, the process of bank privatization in Bulgaria was achieved in that period,
19 
and  on  June  the  2
nd  2003  the  BNB  adopted  the  RINGS  (Real-time  INterbank  Gross 
Settlement)  system  which  allowed  for  real-time  settlement  between  banks  (previously, 
settlements were allowed at fixed hours, several times a day).  Finally,  this decision went 
                                                 
19 The number of foreign commercial banks increased from 14 (1997) to 35 (2003), and their share in total 
banking assets from 32.7% (1996) to 72.8% (2005), the largest majority of foreign banks being EMU-based.   12 
along with the suppression of the 0.5% fee on exchange operations and with the allowance to 
exchange BGL against EURO brought from abroad (and the other way around). 
  To account for these changes, we present in Figure 4 the results of the estimation of 
the benchmark VAR on a sub-sample restricted to start with the observation 2003:Q3.
20 







2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20








2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20









2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20








2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20





2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of M to IEU
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
The dynamics of the main Bulgarian variables are remarkably close to the ones from 
the  estimation  on  the  entire  sample.  The  interest  rate,  output,  prices  and  money  exhibit 
responses  in  the  same  direction,  however  with  some  minor  losses  in  terms  of  statistical 
significance, which may be explained by a relatively important reduction in the number of 
observations (from 46 to 30). Then again, the fact that reaction functions are less significant 
may add to the fact that, while the CB may have established the environment for a close 
integration, the 2003 reforms have contributed to lubricating the mechanism and lead to an 
even stronger integration between the Bulgaria and the EMU. 
 
(c)  our  final  robustness  analysis  discusses  the  fact  that,  while  accounting  for  the  2003 
structural break, results suffer from a reduced number of observations problem. To overcome 
this issue, we estimate our benchmark model on monthly data, for the sample July 2003 – 
December 2010 (78 observations). Monthly data are available for all considered series except 
                                                 
20 The reduced number of observation in the sub-sample below the breaking point makes results little reliable.   13 
output,  which  we  replace  by  the  industrial  production.  Figure  5  below  depicts  response 
functions following a shock on the ECB interest rate. 
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Response of M to IEU
Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
Results on monthly data expand and confirm the findings on quarterly data for the same 
period (see Figure 4 above). The domestic interest rate follows the ECB rate with a lag in the 
short-term, and then the two paths exhibit similar dynamics. Output increases in the short run 
and then becomes rapidly statistically insignificant, as it is the case for prices and money, 
confirming that in a CB monetary system shocks on the ECB rate are short lasted and of low 
magnitude. Our results are all the more robust, as some authors have pointed out noticeable 
changes  in  the  response  functions  when  one  changes  the  frequency  of  the  data  (see  for 
example, Egert and MacDonald, 2009). 
 
3.2. The impact of a change in the FED policy on the Bulgarian economy 
While the analysis up to this point is dedicated to the interest rate channel, we focus in 
this subsection on the exchange rate channel. Of course, the CB in Bulgaria implies that the 
exchange  rate  with  the  anchor  (the  EURO)  is  constant,  which  is  why  this  analysis  is 
unfeasible. However, Bulgaria still has important trade relations with countries like Turkey, 
Russia etc., and these countries are/were heavily linked to the USD. Therefore, we estimate 
that changes in the FED policy, as well as in the BGL/USD exchange rate, may have some 
influence on the Bulgarian economy.   14 
  We  study  the  reaction  of  the  Bulgarian  economy  following  a  change  in  the  FED 
interest rate, and we assume a transmission mechanism identical to the one in the benchmark 
model, with two exceptions: we replace the ECB rate with the FED rate, which is now the 
source of exogenous shocks, and we introduce the Bulgarian Lev to USD exchange rate just 
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Response of M to IUS
Response to Generalized One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
The effects of the FED interest rate on the Bulgarian economy are quite different when 
compared to the impact of the ECB rate. The Bulgarian interest rate presents no significant 
reaction in the first quarters, suggesting that shocks on FED take more time to be absorbed. 
This is also true for prices and money, which exhibit some significance after several quarters. 
In particular we find again the positive correlation between domestic interest rate, prices and 
money, as money is basically demand-driven in the CB. Output is statistically significant 
increasing in the short-run, which may be explained by (i) the initial contraction of 
BG i  which 
may favour domestic investment, and (ii) by a competitiveness effect that transits through the 
exchange  rate  channel.  Indeed,  observe  that  an  increase  in 
US i   leads  to  a  statistically 
significant increase in the BGL/USD exchange rate, namely a “standard” depreciation of the 
LEV  with  respect  to  the  USD  (a  higher 
US i   increases  US  asset  demand  relatively  to  the 
demand in the rest-of-the-world assets). However, in the medium-run, the Bulgarian interest 
                                                 
21 The FED interest rate is also stationary (see Table 1), while Appendix 4 suggests the adoption of the lag 1.   15 
rate  significantly  increases  and  follows  the  raise  in  the  FED  rate,  which  offsets  output. 
Finally, notice that results are qualitatively unchanged when considering that shocks in the 
FED transit first through the ECB rate, before affecting Bulgarian variables (see Appendix C). 
Consequently,  on  the  one  hand,  compared  to  their  response  to  ECB  rate  shocks, 
Bulgarian variables respond less in the short-run; the responses become significant latter in 
time; and they display more persistent reactions to shocks (4 to 5 quarters more for prices and 
money, for instance). These results may suggest that Bulgaria is more integrated with the 
EMU, compared to other regions (in our case, the USD area). On the other hand, the exchange 
rate  has  relatively  little  impact  (in  terms  of  size,  persistence  and  significance)  on  the 
Bulgarian economy, with respect to its impact in countries with autonomous monetary policy, 
as it is the case for Hungary and Poland where Touré, Trabelsi and Dufourt (2009) conclude 




The  goal  of  the  present  paper  is  to  present  evidence  regarding  the  integration  of 
Bulgaria  into  the  EMU,  by  analyzing  the  response  of  the  Bulgarian  economy  to  external 
monetary shocks. To this end, the presence of a Currency Board monetary system is a crucial 
issue that one should consider, since under a CB neither the domestic interest rate, nor the 
money supply, are the resorts of the Bulgarian National Bank. This raises two problems. On 
the one hand, one should indentify the possible sources of monetary volatility. Among several 
possible candidates, we focus in this paper on the ECB interest rate (Bulgarian currency is in 
a fixed exchange rate with the EURO through the CB) and the FED interest rate (countries 
linked to the USD-area are the second trade partner of Bulgaria, after the EMU countries). On 
the  other  hand,  the  econometric  method  should  account  for  the  fact  that  there  is  little 
knowledge regarding the transmission of external monetary shocks in a CB; for this reason, 
we  replace  the  commonly  used  Structural  VARs  by  GIRFs,  which  are  insensitive  to  the 
ordering of variables. 
We find that the Bulgarian interest rate follows, with a small lag, the ECB interest rate 
dynamics in the short-run, while it follows the FED interest rate dynamics with a certain 
delay. Regarding other monetary and real variables (output, money or prices), they exhibit 
smaller persistence and become non-significant earlier in time following an ECB interest rate 
                                                 
22 The results we emphasize for Bulgaria concern the exchange rate with the USD. Consequently, one should be 
cautious when comparing them with exchange rate effects in other CEEC, which usually make reference to the 
exchange rate with the EURO.   16 
shock, compared to a FED interest rate shock. This result could suggest that the CB may have 
worked as a good convergence device between Bulgaria and the EMU, with respect to other 
foreign partners. 
More important, shocks in the ECB interest rate are found to be short-lived and with 
little statistical significance, compared to their usually important effects in CEEC outlined by 
the  existing  literature.  This  result  holds  when  accounting  for  several  sources  causing  the 
instability  of  results  in  the  related  literature,  namely  the  frequency  of  observations,  the 
variables  considered  and  the  structural  breaks,  usually  regarding  changes  in  the  financial 
market. Consequently, one may assume that Bulgaria is relatively better integrated with the 
EMU,  compared  to  other  CEEC  and  particularly  to  countries  that  conserved  monetary 
autonomy.  Further  research  could  deepen  our  results  by  investigating  the  contribution  of 
Bulgarian  “second  generation”  CB  features  (the  required  reserve  ratio,  the  Government 
Account and the LOLR function) in the responses of Bulgarian variables to shocks.   17 
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Appendix 1 – Lag selection and other tests for the benchmark VAR model 
 
LR test (LR, column 1), final prediction error (FPE, column 2), Akaike information criterion (AIC, column 3), 
Schwarz information criterion (SC, column 4), Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ, column 5). 
 
           
             Lag  LR  FPE  AIC  SC  HQ 
           
            0  NA  1.83e-17  -24.34903  -24.14216  -24.27320 
1  210.9127  1.74e-19  -29.01724  -27.77604  -28.56229 
2  28.66443  2.39e-19  -28.75142  -26.47590  -27.91735 
3  28.16468  3.06e-19  -28.64420  -25.33435  -27.43101 
           
             
 
 
Equation  LM (4)
a  ARCH (4)  JB (2) 
EU i   1.37994 (0.2379)
b  0.12096 (0.9741)  3.19091 (0.2028) 
BG i   1.27554 (0.2997)  0.15546 (0.8565)  2.11424 (0.3474) 
Y    1.12543 (0.3543)  0.014404 (0.999)  1.11607 (0.5723) 
IPC   1.23807 (0.3177)  0.11933 (0.9747)  1.17965 (0.5544) 
M    1.780537 (0.1005)  1.28388 (0.2944)  3.32488 (0.1896) 
Notes: 
a – LM (4) denotes Lagrange Multiplicator test of order 4; ARCH (4) denotes Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
test of order 4; and JB (2) denotes Jarque-Bera (with two degrees of freedom) normality test. 
b  –  the number  in brackets  indicates  the  marginal  asymptotic  level,  namely  the  probability  to exceed  the  value  of  the 
computed statistic. Hence, for instance, a marginal asymptotic level of 23.79% (0.2379) means that for a significance level 
smaller than 23.79%, the null hypothesis of absence of residual serial correlation of order 4 cannot be rejected by data.   19 
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    Root  Modulus 
   
   
0.869985 - 0.192693i  0.891069 
0.869985 + 0.192693i  0.891069 
0.719316  0.719316 
0.482733  0.482733 
0.319098  0.319098 
   
    Note:  no  root  lies  outside  the  unit  circle,  thus  the 




Appendix 3 – Reduction of the size of the VAR by restraining the number of variables 
The first four-variables VAR 
(
EU i , 
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The second four-variables VAR 
(
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Appendix 4 – Lag selection for the VAR with the FED interest rate and the BGL / USD 
exchange rate 
LR test (LR, column 1), final prediction error (FPE, column 2), Akaike information criterion (AIC, column 3), 
Schwarz information criterion (SC, column 4), Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ, column 5). 
 
           
             Lag  LR  FPE  AIC  SC  HQ 
           
            0  NA  5.42e-19  -25.03149  -24.78325  -24.94050 
1  265.0984  1.58e-21  -30.89144  -29.15377  -30.25452 
2  44.33028  2.11e-21  -30.70579  -27.47869  -29.52293 
3  45.75518  2.16e-21  -30.98086  -26.26433  -29.25206 
           
               20 
TECHNICAL APPENDICES  
 
 
Appendix A – Technical details for the computation of GIRFs 
Suppose that the internal dynamic of the  ( )
'
1 ,..., nt t t X X X =  vector can be suitably 
captured by the  ( ) p VAR  representation defined as the regression of the  t X  vector on its past: 
( ) T t X L B t t ,..., 1 , = =e , with  ( )






























i n L B I L B
1
 is a polynomial matrix in  L (the lag operator), with  ( ) n I B = 0  ( n I  the 
n-square unity matrix) and  ( )
'
1 ,..., nt t t e e e =  is a  n-dimensional vector of white noises (of 
variance-covariance  matrix  W),  such  as  shocks  are  contemporaneously  correlated.  The 
inverse of the roots (z) of the characteristic equation ( ( ) Det B z     0 = ) are supposed to be of 
modulus strictly inferior to one (stationarity condition), allowing interpreting  t e  as canonical 
innovations (namely as the part of  t X  which cannot be linearly explained by its own past). 
Using the Wold representation it is possible to rewrite (A1) equivalently under the 
well-known moving average form: 












i n L B I L C
1
 is a polynomial matrix in  L, which provides the dynamic effects of 
each  innovation  on  each  variable,  with  ( ) n I C = 0 .  The  GIRF  of  it X   (for  example,  the 
Bulgarian interest rate 
BG i ) to a unit (one standard deviation) shock in  jt X  (for example, the 
ECB  interest  rate 
EU i )  is  then  given  by  ( ) ( ) i j ii N ij e e GIRF W =
- ' 2 / 1
, s   where  ii s is  the  i-th 
diagonal element of W,  i e  and  j e  are selection vectors (with respectively the i-th and the  j -
th element equal to one and all other elements equal to zero) and  N  is the horizon. 
   21 
Appendix B – IRFs in the recursive SVAR based on Cholesky decomposition 
Note:  Technically  speaking,  Pesaran  and  Shin  (1998)  have  shown  that  for  a  non-diagonal  error 
variance matrix, the orthogonalized and the GIRFs coincide only in the case of the impulse responses 
of the shocks to the first equation in the VAR. Since the only shock we study (following our economic 
analysis in the main text) is the one on the ECB interest rate (the first variable in the VAR), the IRFs 
in the presented recursive SVAR are identical to the GIRFs in the main text. However, from an 
economic viewpoint, one should retain that our results are robust in two specifications: in a recursive 
SVAR with variables placed in an intuitive order and when computing general response functions that 
are unaltered by the ordering of the variables. 
Remark:  Under  this  recursive  identification,  shocks  in 
BG i   (more  precisely,  responses  of 
BG i   to 
changes in 
EU i ) contemporaneously affect 
BG i ,  Y ,  IPC and  M , changes in  Y  contemporaneously 
affect Y ,  IPC and  M , changes in  IPC contemporaneously affect  IPC and  M , while changes in  M  
contemporaneously affect  3 M  exclusively. Putting 
EU i  first implies that changes in other variables do 
not contemporaneously affect 
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Note: The fact that IRFs to shocks stabilize and come back towards zero indicates, on the one hand, that the 
SVAR model is correctly specified and, on the other, that all macroeconomic series are integrated of order zero.   22 
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